Conception, Fertilization and the Onset of Human Personhood: A Note on the Case Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica

 

Autores
Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
Versión publicada
Año de publicación
2013
País
Argentina
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Descripción
In this critical note it is argued that one of the crucial arguments of the recent judgment by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Artavia Murillo fails and shows a common conceptual confusion in legal argumentation. The Court considers that the word “conception” in paragraph 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights must be understood as “implantation,” and not, as claimed by one part of the doctrine and the minority opinion in this case, as “ fertilization.” The normative consequence of this interpretation is that preimplantation embryos (for example, embryos in vitro) do not enjoy the legal protections established by the Convention, that is, the protection (in general) of a right to life. The main argument for this interpretation is that a preimplantation embryo is not viable unless it is implanted in the uterus. The argument is fallacious, since it attempts to support a normative conclusion on scientific, empirical premises alone.
Idioma
inglés
OAI Identifier
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/27546
Enlace del recurso
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/27546
Nivel de acceso
Acceso abierto
Materia
Concepción
Fertilización
Aborto
Derechos Humanos