The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America

The rise of ride‐hailing platforms has profoundly transformed urban mobility in Latin America over the past decade. Transportation Network Companies such as Uber, DiDi, Cabify, InDrive, and others operating in the region have affected transportation patterns and intensified debates around labor rela...

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Bibliographic Details
Author: Sáenz Leandro, Ronald
Format: article
Status:Published version
Publication Date:2026
Country:España
Institution:Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)
Repository:O2, repositorio institucional de la UOC
OAI Identifier:oai:openaccess.uoc.edu:10609/153959
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10609/153959
https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.70039
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Latin America
platform governance
regulation
ride‐hailing
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spelling The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America Sáenz Leandro, Ronald Chile Colombia Costa Rica Latin America platform governance regulation ride‐hailing The rise of ride‐hailing platforms has profoundly transformed urban mobility in Latin America over the past decade. Transportation Network Companies such as Uber, DiDi, Cabify, InDrive, and others operating in the region have affected transportation patterns and intensified debates around labor relations, algorithmic management, regulatory challenges, and urban sustainability. This article examines the trajectories of platform regulation in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica through the lens of platform‐policy frictions, highlighting the tensions and negotiations between the aspirations of platform capitalism and the particularities of local environments. More than 10 years after Transportation Network Companies arrived in the region, Chile has enacted a regulatory framework, whereas Colombia and Costa Rica continue to grapple with legislative inertia and fragmented policy responses. The study introduces the concept of the “De Facto Deregulation Trap” to explain how institutional fragmentation, political stalemate, and stakeholder strategies perpetuate indefinite regulatory uncertainty. The research highlights how regulatory outcomes on platform regulation depend on political negotiations, institutional capacities, and stakeholder power dynamics. The findings contribute to the literature on platform governance by demonstrating how frictions operate as barriers to regulation and arenas for contestation and adaptation in the Global South, offering valuable lessons for global tech policy and digital change. John Wiley & Son https://hdl.handle.net/10609/153959 https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.70039
title The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America
spellingShingle The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America
Sáenz Leandro, Ronald
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Latin America
platform governance
regulation
ride‐hailing
title_short The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America
title_full The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America
title_fullStr The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America
title_full_unstemmed The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America
title_sort The Long and Winding Road: Policy Frictions and theGovernance of Ride‐Hailing Platforms in Latin America
author Sáenz Leandro, Ronald
author_facet Sáenz Leandro, Ronald
author_role author
topic Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Latin America
platform governance
regulation
ride‐hailing
topic_facet Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Latin America
platform governance
regulation
ride‐hailing
description The rise of ride‐hailing platforms has profoundly transformed urban mobility in Latin America over the past decade. Transportation Network Companies such as Uber, DiDi, Cabify, InDrive, and others operating in the region have affected transportation patterns and intensified debates around labor relations, algorithmic management, regulatory challenges, and urban sustainability. This article examines the trajectories of platform regulation in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica through the lens of platform‐policy frictions, highlighting the tensions and negotiations between the aspirations of platform capitalism and the particularities of local environments. More than 10 years after Transportation Network Companies arrived in the region, Chile has enacted a regulatory framework, whereas Colombia and Costa Rica continue to grapple with legislative inertia and fragmented policy responses. The study introduces the concept of the “De Facto Deregulation Trap” to explain how institutional fragmentation, political stalemate, and stakeholder strategies perpetuate indefinite regulatory uncertainty. The research highlights how regulatory outcomes on platform regulation depend on political negotiations, institutional capacities, and stakeholder power dynamics. The findings contribute to the literature on platform governance by demonstrating how frictions operate as barriers to regulation and arenas for contestation and adaptation in the Global South, offering valuable lessons for global tech policy and digital change.
publishDate 2026
format article
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url https://hdl.handle.net/10609/153959
https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.70039
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
publisher John Wiley & Son
institution Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)
collection O2, repositorio institucional de la UOC
reponame_str O2, repositorio institucional de la UOC
instname_str Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)
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publishDateSort 2026
author_browse Sáenz Leandro, Ronald
publisherStr John Wiley & Son
score 6,924472