An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their p...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/199460 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem |
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oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/199460 |
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España |
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An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game Atay, Ata Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002. Elsevier B.V. https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460 |
| title |
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game |
| spellingShingle |
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game Atay, Ata Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem |
| title_short |
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game |
| title_full |
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game |
| title_fullStr |
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game |
| title_full_unstemmed |
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game |
| title_sort |
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game |
| author |
Atay, Ata |
| author_facet |
Atay, Ata |
| author_role |
author |
| topic |
Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem |
| topic_facet |
Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem |
| description |
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002. |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| format |
article |
| status_str |
acceptedVersion |
| url |
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460 |
| eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
| publisher |
Elsevier B.V. |
| institution |
Universidad de Barcelona |
| collection |
Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| reponame_str |
Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| instname_str |
Universidad de Barcelona |
| _version_ |
1878440757284569088 |
| publishDateSort |
2017 |
| author_browse |
Atay, Ata |
| publisherStr |
Elsevier B.V. |
| score |
6,924472 |